COBALT FOR CLINICS
The quiet return of extractive diplomacy in global health
The quiet return of extractive diplomacy in global health
In February 2025, a mother in southern Zambia walked four kilometers to a clinic that was no longer open. The antiretroviral drugs her HIV-positive daughter had been taking for three years were gone—not because the treatment had failed, not because the supply chain had broken down, but because a man in Washington had signed a piece of paper. Thousands of kilometers away, in the same week, officials from the United States government were presenting Zambia's health ministry with a new offer: continued medical support, in exchange for a separate agreement on copper and cobalt.
The clinic was closed. The deal was on the table.
This is what "America First" looks like when it lands in sub-Saharan Africa. Not the abstract geopolitical competition described in think-tank reports. Not the diplomatic euphemisms about "strategic partnerships" and "mutual benefit." A mother. A closed clinic. And a mineral compact waiting to be signed.
The Trump administration did not stumble into this situation through negligence or poor planning. It engineered it. The dismantling of USAID and the gutting of PEPFAR were not bureaucratic reforms that happened to disrupt health programs. They were leverage plays—deliberate acts of destruction designed to maximize Washington's negotiating position in the bilateral discussions that followed. You do not need to speculate about intent. The sequencing tells the story: first, destroy the infrastructure; then, offer to rebuild it on new terms. The terms involve minerals.
What is unfolding across mineral-rich Africa right now is not a new model of development cooperation. It is an old model of extraction, wearing a diplomatic suit.
To grasp the scale of what has been lost, you have to understand what was built.
PEPFAR—the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief—was launched in 2003 under George W. Bush as what was then described as the largest commitment by any nation to combat a single disease in history. By the time the Trump administration began dismantling it in early 2025, it had supported antiretroviral treatment for more than twenty million people, prevented an estimated two and a half million babies from being born with HIV, and trained hundreds of thousands of health workers across sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. Peer-reviewed research published in the Lancet estimated that PEPFAR had averted approximately twenty-one million deaths over its first two decades of operation.
USAID's broader health portfolio extended across malaria prevention, tuberculosis treatment, maternal and child health, vaccine distribution, and epidemic surveillance. In Mozambique, American funding supported more than half of the national HIV treatment program. In Uganda, PEPFAR-financed facilities were responsible for the majority of antiretroviral dispensing. In Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Lesotho, the structural dependency was similar: American money flowing through NGO-managed supply chains had become, functionally, a core component of the national health system.
This dependency was a known problem. Development economists and global health scholars had spent years arguing that aid architectures which bypass state institutions—routing funding through international NGOs and donor-managed systems rather than national health ministries—create fragility rather than resilience. Governments became reliant on infrastructure they did not control, could not adapt to their own priorities, and were not building the fiscal capacity to sustain independently. The critics were right about the structural problem.
What they did not anticipate—or at least, what most of them did not anticipate—was that the United States would exploit that fragility quite so deliberately.
When DOGE operatives arrived at USAID headquarters in February 2025 and began dismissing staff, freezing programs, and locking employees out of their offices, they were not conducting an efficiency review. They were executing a political decision that had already been made: that the humanitarian aid model was to be ended, and that something more transactional would replace it. Within weeks, programs that had operated continuously for more than a decade—HIV treatment continuums, malaria surveillance networks, maternal health supply chains—were suspended or terminated without transition planning, without notice to recipient governments, and without any assessment of the immediate consequences for patient populations.
The consequences were immediate. In South Africa, treatment interruptions created the conditions for drug-resistant HIV strains to develop and spread—an outcome with implications that extend far beyond the patients initially affected. In Nigeria, supply chain disruptions hit malaria prevention programs during peak transmission season. In Tanzania, community health worker programs that had taken years to build were defunded overnight, leaving rural populations without the primary care access they had come to depend on. In Ethiopia, already under severe strain from conflict and food insecurity, the loss of American health funding compounded crises that were already near the breaking point.
The human cost of these disruptions is not, at this point, fully documented. It will not be fully documented for years, because the people dying as a result of interrupted treatment do not die in ways that generate headlines in American newspapers. They die quietly, in clinics that are no longer stocked, from conditions that were manageable last year. Their deaths will show up eventually in mortality statistics and epidemiological reports that will be read by researchers who will draw careful, hedged conclusions in the passive voice.
The Trump administration is counting on that distance. The gap between the policy decision and its visible human consequences is one of the primary political protections that makes this kind of damage politically sustainable in Washington.
To understand the ideology animating this shift, it helps to listen to what American officials have actually said, rather than what they claim to intend.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated shortly after taking office that American foreign assistance exists not to help others but to "further the national interests of the United States." USAID, in his framing, had been captured by ideologically motivated bureaucrats pursuing a progressive development agenda that bore little relationship to American strategic priorities. The solution was not reform but deconstruction—and replacement with a leaner, more explicitly transactional model of bilateral engagement.
The national interest in question, as policy documents make clear, is substantially about minerals. The United States has identified cobalt, lithium, copper, graphite, nickel, and rare earth elements as critical inputs to the green energy transition and the advanced electronics supply chains that underpin American technological competitiveness. The problem, from Washington's perspective, is that a large proportion of global reserves of these materials are located in central and southern Africa—in countries where China has, over the past two decades, invested very heavily in mining infrastructure, processing facilities, and the diplomatic relationships that protect them.
The Democratic Republic of Congo holds an estimated seventy percent of the world's known cobalt reserves. Zambia and the DRC together account for roughly half of global copper production. Zimbabwe possesses one of the largest lithium deposits on earth, as well as significant platinum group metal reserves. In each of these countries, Chinese companies—many of them state-linked—have established dominant or significant positions in the extractive sector. The CMOC Group, a Chinese mining company, overtook the Swiss-Australian firm Glencore in 2023 to become the world's largest cobalt producer, primarily through its operations in the DRC.
From Washington's perspective, this represents an unacceptable strategic exposure. American battery manufacturers, electric vehicle producers, and defense contractors depend on mineral supply chains that are increasingly routed through Chinese-controlled infrastructure. The solution, as conceived by the Trump administration's foreign policy team, is to use every available instrument of American leverage to renegotiate the terms of African resource governance in ways that favor American commercial interests. Health assistance—or rather, the threat of its withdrawal—turns out to be an exceptionally powerful instrument of that leverage.
This is the context in which the "bilateral health compacts" being offered to African governments must be understood. They are not health programs. They are mineral access agreements with health components attached, structured in ways that make the health components contingent on progress in the mineral discussions. The administration has been careful to keep the linkage implicit in most cases—careful enough that some officials have disputed it exists at all—but the leaked draft framework for Zambia made the connection explicit: health funding was to be conditioned on conclusion of a separate bilateral compact covering the mining sector.
That is not ambiguous. It is also not a partnership. It is a shakedown.
To understand what makes these new arrangements so corrosive, it helps to look past the diplomatic language and examine what is actually being proposed.
The Zambia framework, to the extent its contents have been reported, is instructive. The agreement would have committed Zambia to a series of performance targets on health service delivery, co-financing requirements that would increase over time, and extensive data-sharing provisions covering epidemiological surveillance information. Critically, it included provisions linking continued American health support to a separate compact on mining—meaning that if the mineral negotiations broke down, the health funding was at risk. The deal also contained arbitration clauses that would have subjected Zambian public health policy to dispute resolution mechanisms operating outside Zambian jurisdiction.
Zambia's government rejected it. The health ministry's statement was careful and diplomatic. Civil society organizations were less restrained. Several described the agreement as structurally identical to the kinds of structural adjustment conditions that the IMF imposed on African economies in the 1980s and 1990s—conditions that devastated public services, entrenched poverty, and generated a debt crisis that lasted for decades—except that instead of fiscal policy, the conditionality was now being applied to public health.
Zimbabwe's situation was similar. The government's official position was that the terms presented undervalued the country's mineral wealth and failed to provide adequate guarantees of benefit-sharing or technology transfer. Behind the diplomatic language was a more fundamental objection: that the deal was structured to give American companies preferential access to Zimbabwean lithium on terms that would not be available to other potential investors, in exchange for health funding that Zimbabwe had previously received without conditions.
A Zimbabwean official, speaking on background, put it more directly: "They want our lithium. The clinics are how they're asking for it."
In Kenya, the government initially appeared willing to engage with the framework before a coalition of civil society organizations and opposition politicians challenged it in the High Court. The legal challenge argued that the agreement—which reportedly contained extensive data-sharing provisions and clauses affecting digital infrastructure—required parliamentary authorization that the executive had bypassed. The court agreed and froze the process pending review. The case is ongoing.
The pattern across all three countries is consistent: agreements structured to maximize American leverage and minimize African policy autonomy, presented under time pressure created by the disruption of existing health programs, with provisions that extend well beyond health into areas of resource governance, data sovereignty, and legal jurisdiction.
These are not deals that a government negotiates freely. They are deals that a government is cornered into considering.
There is a dimension of these agreements that receives far less attention than the mineral provisions, and in some respects it is the most revealing: data.
Several of the proposed frameworks reportedly require extensive, long-term sharing of epidemiological surveillance data and pathogen samples—in Zambia's case, for periods reportedly stretching to a decade for health data and twenty-five years for pathogen information. To appreciate the significance of this, it helps to understand what epidemiological data is worth in 2025.
We are living through a moment of extraordinary convergence between biological science, artificial intelligence, and pharmaceutical development. The ability to train predictive models on population-level health data—to identify outbreak trajectories before they become crises, to map the genetic characteristics of emerging pathogens, to develop targeted therapeutics for diseases that disproportionately affect specific populations—depends on exactly the kind of granular, longitudinal, geographically diverse datasets that African health systems generate. The African continent, with its extraordinary biological diversity, its disease burden, and its epidemiological complexity, is one of the most scientifically valuable sources of biological information on earth.
This information has market value. It has strategic value. And the proposed health agreements are structured to ensure that it flows—on a one-way basis, for decades, under terms set by Washington—to American research institutions, government health agencies, and, indirectly, to the pharmaceutical and technology companies that partner with them.
The pattern this creates is structurally identical to the one that has characterized Africa's relationship with the global economy for more than a century. Raw inputs—whether they are cobalt, cocoa, or viral sequences—originate in Africa. The capacity to transform them into battery cells, chocolate bars, patented vaccines, or AI-driven diagnostic tools remains concentrated in wealthy countries. The finished products return to global markets at prices that the populations who provided the raw materials cannot afford.
Cobalt goes to American battery factories. Viral sequences go to American research institutions and biodefense agencies. The electric vehicles and the vaccines come back at prices calibrated to what markets in wealthy countries will bear.
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated exactly how this asymmetry operates in practice. African countries—particularly South Africa and several others—were among the primary sources of data on the Delta and Omicron variants. The scientific community's ability to respond to those variants as quickly as it did depended substantially on the epidemiological surveillance and genomic sequencing capacity that had been built, in part, with international support in African countries. Those countries were then placed at the back of the vaccine queue. COVAX, the mechanism designed to ensure equitable vaccine distribution, was systematically underfunded and outmaneuvered by wealthy countries that had secured bilateral supply agreements.
This outcome was not accidental. It was the predictable result of a system in which biological data is treated as a global public good during the collection phase, and a privately appropriable asset during the commercialization phase. The new bilateral health agreements, by securing pathogen data outside the WHO's Pandemic Treaty process—which is specifically designed to establish benefit-sharing obligations for countries that provide biological samples—are structured to lock in this arrangement on contractual terms and make it binding for a generation.
The Trump administration's decision to withdraw from Pandemic Treaty negotiations while simultaneously pursuing bilateral pathogen data agreements is not contradictory. It is entirely coherent. The multilateral process would create obligations of reciprocity. The bilateral approach extracts the data without them. For an administration whose foreign policy is organized around the question of what America can extract from a given situation, the choice is obvious.
Critics, including several international health law scholars, have described this as a form of "biological sovereignty violation"—the unilateral appropriation of population-level health information by a foreign power, structured through agreements that governments sign under duress. The framing may be contested. The underlying dynamic is not.
The Trump administration did not invent extractive diplomacy. It rediscovered it.
The structural logic of what is being proposed in these bilateral health agreements is not new. It is, in fact, extremely old—old enough that historians have a well-developed vocabulary for describing it. Colonial economies across Africa were organized around the extraction of raw materials destined for industrial processing in European metropoles. Infrastructure—railways, ports, telegraph lines—was built not to develop local economies but to facilitate the outward flow of commodities. Trade arrangements were designed to prevent the development of local manufacturing capacity that might compete with imports. Administrative structures were calibrated to maintain the labor conditions necessary for extraction.
The century of post-independence development that followed was, in substantial part, an effort to restructure these relationships—to capture more of the value added from African resources, to diversify away from commodity dependence, to build the institutional capacity necessary for economic sovereignty. That project achieved real gains. It also encountered persistent resistance from the international financial and trade architecture that had been constructed, in the postwar period, primarily to serve the interests of wealthy countries.
Today, as the global energy transition drives unprecedented demand for the minerals embedded in African geology, that pressure is intensifying. The International Energy Agency projects that demand for cobalt will increase by a factor of six by 2040 under moderate decarbonization scenarios. Lithium demand could increase tenfold. Copper—the indispensable metal of electrification—faces supply constraints that no amount of recycling or substitution will fully resolve. The countries that hold these reserves are sitting on what the global economy will, over the next several decades, need desperately.
This creates both opportunity and danger. The opportunity is that mineral wealth, if governed well and revenues deployed strategically, could fund the infrastructure, health systems, and educational investment that previous commodity booms failed to deliver. The danger is that the same dynamics that have historically plagued resource-rich countries—elite capture, institutional corrosion, Dutch disease, predatory external partnerships—will reassert themselves in new forms.
The Trump administration's mineral-for-health framework represents exactly the kind of predatory external partnership that makes the danger case more likely. By linking health assistance—a sector where dependency is acute and the political cost of refusal falls immediately on vulnerable populations—to mineral access negotiations, Washington is using the leverage created by twenty years of aid relationships to secure resource deals that African governments would not otherwise agree to on these terms. The result is not a renegotiation of colonial-era extraction. It is its continuation by updated means.
The African proverb is apposite here: when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. Washington and Beijing are fighting over African minerals. The grass, in this case, is the woman who walked four kilometers to a clinic that was no longer open.
There is a political silence at the center of this story that deserves more attention than it has received.
When USAID-funded programs began shutting down across the continent—when clinics closed, treatment chains broke, and community health workers went unpaid—the response from many African heads of state was conspicuously muted. There were no emergency summits of the African Union. No coordinated diplomatic démarches. No joint statement from the continent's major economies. A few individual governments made quiet representations through diplomatic channels. The silence of the others was not passivity. It was calculation.
Defending USAID programs too loudly means acknowledging how deeply dependent those systems had become on external financing—an admission that exposes not just institutional fragility but a decades-long failure to build domestically financed, domestically controlled health infrastructure. The structural dependency that American aid helped create now makes it politically costly to criticize American aid's withdrawal. You cannot, without embarrassment, demand the continuation of a system whose very existence proves that you never built something better.
This is the trap. And Washington knew it was there because Washington helped build it.
The Trump administration, to the credit of its cynicism, grasped this dynamic with considerable sophistication. By destroying USAID quickly, loudly, and without apology—in the first weeks of the administration, before opposition had time to organize—it compressed the political window in which African governments, international health organizations, and American civil society groups could mount a coherent response. By immediately offering bilateral replacements, it fragmented what might have been a multilateral negotiating bloc into a series of individual conversations, each conducted under the immediate pressure of health crises, each weighted by the same structural asymmetry.
Divide. Pressure. Extract.
The response from other wealthy countries has been almost equally inadequate. European governments, several of which have their own strategic mineral interests in Africa and their own concerns about Chinese dominance of critical supply chains, have largely watched from the sidelines. Some have quietly increased their own bilateral health and development engagements, presenting themselves as more reliable alternatives to the United States—a reasonable position, but one that has not translated into public solidarity with African governments facing coercive American terms, or into meaningful institutional pressure on Washington to reverse course.
The international health community—WHO, Gavi, the Global Fund—has been more vocal, but operates under significant constraints. The Trump administration withdrew from WHO in its first term and has maintained its hostility to multilateral health institutions. The Global Fund, which depends on American contributions for roughly a third of its budget, faces its own funding pressures as Washington reassesses its commitments.
The structural result is that African governments are largely negotiating alone, against the full weight of American leverage, in real time, with their populations' health in the balance. That is exactly the situation the Trump administration designed.
None of this is inevitable. Several African governments have demonstrated that the terms on offer can be refused.
Zambia's rejection of the draft framework was, in the immediate term, economically painful. Health ministry officials were aware that the decision would mean continued disruption to programs that American funding had supported. They made it anyway—a decision that deserves to be understood as a political act with real moral weight, not merely a technical disagreement over contract terms.
Zimbabwe's resistance was complicated by its own complex history with Western sanctions and the political dynamics of the ZANU-PF government, which has its own legitimacy problems and its own calculations about relationships with Beijing and Washington. But the substantive objection—that the deal undervalued Zimbabwean resources and failed to provide for meaningful benefit-sharing or technology transfer—was a reasonable one, and the government's willingness to state it publicly matters.
Kenya's legal challenge is perhaps the most significant precedent, because it established that there is a domestic constitutional argument against executive negotiation of agreements of this scope without parliamentary oversight. That argument—which connects the specific terms of the bilateral health framework to broader questions of democratic governance and separation of powers—is available to other African governments facing similar pressures. It transforms the question from a purely diplomatic one (whether to accept Washington's terms) into a domestic constitutional one (whether the executive has the authority to accept them without legislative scrutiny), which is a much stronger political position.
These individual acts of resistance are necessary but not sufficient. The structural asymmetry of bilateral negotiations means that Washington can, in principle, continue to apply pressure until a government in a sufficiently desperate position agrees to unfavorable terms—and then use that agreement as a precedent to pressure others. The only effective counter to this strategy is collective action.
The African Union is the obvious vehicle for this, but it has historically struggled to translate rhetorical solidarity into operational coordination on issues where member states have divergent immediate interests. The African Continental Free Trade Area provides a potential framework for coordinated positions on mineral governance and trade terms. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention could provide a platform for continental standards on data governance and pathogen sharing. None of these institutions currently has the political authority or the operational capacity to mount the kind of coordinated response that would meaningfully change the negotiating dynamic.
Building that capacity is a long-term project. The health crises being created by American policy decisions are immediate. That gap—between the timeline of institutional development and the timeline of humanitarian emergency—is another dimension of the trap.
What is clear, however, is that the alternative to collective coordination is a continent of individually pressured governments, each making the best deal it can under conditions of maximum American leverage. That is precisely what the Trump administration is hoping for.
The Trump administration built nothing in global health. It inherited a system built by others—imperfect, dependency-creating, structurally problematic in its own ways, but responsible for saving tens of millions of lives—and identified in it an opportunity. The opportunity was leverage. The leverage was lives.
Future historians examining this period will be struck by several things. They will note the extraordinary speed with which two decades of public health infrastructure were dismantled—not reformed, not transitioned, but abruptly shut down, with deliberate indifference to the immediate human consequences. They will note the inversion of stated values: an administration that claimed to prioritize American strength used the suffering of sick people in other countries as a negotiating instrument. They will note the contradictions: the same administration that withdrew from the World Health Organization and defunded global vaccination initiatives simultaneously sought privileged bilateral access to the epidemiological data that multilateral health cooperation had made possible.
They will also note the profound moral failure of a moment in which the world's wealthiest and most powerful country—a country that had, whatever its other failures, spent twenty years demonstrating that it was capable of large-scale humanitarian commitment—chose to cash in that commitment for cobalt.
It is worth being precise about what that choice represents. The United States is not a poor country making hard choices about limited resources. It is the world's largest economy, with a defense budget larger than the next ten countries combined, in the middle of a domestic economic expansion. The decision to leverage African health systems for mineral access is not a decision forced by scarcity. It is a decision made by choice, by an administration whose ideological commitments include the proposition that concern for the welfare of people in other countries is a form of weakness.
That ideology has a name. In American political discourse, it is called populist nationalism. In the countries where its foreign policy consequences are being felt most acutely, it is understood as something older and more familiar: the assertion by a powerful country that its interests take precedence over the lives of people who happen to be poorer, darker, and farther away.
The mother who walked four kilometers to a closed clinic did not make a geopolitical calculation. She was not a variable in a mineral supply chain analysis. She was trying to get medicine for her daughter.
The Trump administration made a choice about what her daughter's life was worth. It decided: less than a cobalt compact.
That is the story. Everything else is footnotes.
The author writes on global health policy, political economy, and African development.
Johan G.L. Verheyden is a social scientist, senior researcher, and research director at Aries Consult. With over three decades of experience in Africa and other fragile and post-conflict settings, his work focuses on political economy, conflict, governance, and international intervention. He specialises in mixed-methods research and critical analysis of global institutions and power structures. A Belgian, he is based in Nairobi, Kenya.
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